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ABSTRACT
State of the art programmable devices are utilizing
advanced processing technologies, non-standard circuit
structures, and unique electrical elements in commercial-off-
the-shelf (COTS)-based, high-performance devices. This
paper will discuss that the above factors, coupled with the
systems application environment, have a strong interplay that
affect the radiation hardness of programmable devices and
have resultant system impacts in (1) reliability of the
unprogrammed, biased antifuse for heavy ions (rupture), (2)
logic upset manifesting itself as clock upset, and (3)
configuration upset. General radiation characteristics of
advanced technologies are examined and manufacturers'
modifications to their COTS-based and their impact on future
programmable devices will be analyzed.
I. INTRODUCTION
Programmable logic has become ubiquitous in spacecraft
electronic designs as they are inherently flexible and provide
systems designers the tools to meet the new trend towards
higher integration and performance with decreasing costs and
development time. This is not unique to spacecraft
electronics as programmable device development is primarily
driven by the commercial sector. As such, the devices are
becoming increasingly sophisticated architecturally, utilizing
unique circuit structures, and are using the most advanced
technologies.
Commercial programmable logic devices are utilizing
advanced technologies, with manufacturers offering 0.35 p,m
and 0.25 p,m products, with improved performance levels
allowing them to replace ASICs in some applications. For
spaceflight electronics, these devices have the potential to
efficiently implement circuits in demanding applications such
as laser altimetry, photon pulse counting, and time-of-flight
electronics.
As the requirements for increased performance drive
device development, we see new structures such as phase-
locked loops, both digital and analog, as an example. While
providing greater system performance by de-skewing clocks
and providing clock multiplication capabilities, these
structures may be susceptible to new radiation effects. Clock
integrity is critical for system applications and we have
examined and analyzed several cases of logic upset in clock
circuitry. Modifications were required and made to the
commercial circuits to reduce device sensitivities to heavy
ions.
High-speed interconnections can be made with metal-to-
metal antifuses, utilizing current processing technologies
such as chemical-mechanical polishing (CMP). While these
antifuses are biased with relatively low electric field
strengths, preliminary studies have shown that these tmique
structures are susceptible to rupture [1]. Various "recipes" for
these elements are explored and data is shown for a high-
speed, radiation-hardened antifuse.
FPGAs, in particular, are now using some of the most
advanced technologies, scaling internal features and
improving performance with some devices operating at lower
core voltages. We have seen what is probably the last
generation of 5 V devices being produced at their limit of
0.45 p,m, the 40MX and 42MX series. All of the major
manufacturers have deep sub-micron devices, generally in the
0.35 _tm technology, some with 0.25 gm features, running at
a 3.3 V core voltage. The state-of-the-art is the announced
0.18 9m device from Vantis (AMD), the VF1 series; this
device runs at a core voltage of 2.5 VDC.
The lower core voltages are attractive to system designers
because of their high speed and lower power consumption,
power being a function of V 2. The effects on the SEU and
total dose characteristics are studied and are relatively
consistent across manufacturers and foundries. Note
however, that these advanced devices, to be usable in
practical systems, retain an input tolerance of 5.5 volts, a
concern for gate rupture in these deep sub-micron processes,
requiring special circuit structures to prevent breakdown and
conduction to the VOD rail.
Configuration upset has been predicted, detected, and
analyzed in FPGAs. While the commercial circuit structures
are specifically designed for robust behavior in the industrial
environment, many design implementations do not handle
faults well in the heavy ion environment.
A variety of devices were evaluated in this paper. Some
are off-the-shelf production devices; others are either pre-
production devices or early prototypes. Applications to a
specific product should be done carefully as continuing
technological advancements are being made by the
manufacturers.
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II. RUPTURE substrates program at approximately 30 VDC supporting
A. Oxide Nitride Oxide (ONO) Antifuses
The ONO antifuse is frequently used in non-volatile
space flight applications. Biased, unprogrammed antifuses
are susceptible to heavy ion-induced rupture and
improvements have been made in antifuse design [1]. Recent
testing has augmented our data set for the hardened antifuse
in the RH1020, with the production devices' antifuses having
a 90 A thickness. Results are shown in Figure 1. The beam
was normal to the die, worst-case, and a fluence of 107
ions/cm 2 used for each run. A significant positive margin
exists above a bias voltage of 5.5 VDC at an LET of
37 MeV-cm2/mg. This is adequate for most missions and the
antifuse can be classified as radiation-tolerant; it has
improved radiation performance over its commercial
ancestors.
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Figure 1. Summary of antifuse rupture data. Positive margin
at LET= 37 MeV-cm2/mg is shown for production RH1020
with a hardened ONO antifuse. One "recipe" of an M2M
antifuse did not fail at LET=82 MeV-em2/mg,
Vr_tAs= 400 mV.
B. Metal-to-Metal (M2M) Antifuses
Metal-to-metal antifuses hold performance advantages
over the ONO version; programmed resistance's are -25-50
ohms versus ~100-500 ohins for FPGA implementations.
M2M antifuse resistance is < 1 ohm for the less density-
critical programmable substrates. These devices are enabled
by advances in processing technologies that are critical for
controlling the thickness of the programmable elements.
References [1-3] discuss their hardness to total dose effects.
While ONO antifuse thickness is of the order of 100 A,
M2M antifuse thickness typically varies from 500 A to
I000 A, resulting in a decreased electric field strength of a
factor of 5 to 10, assuming equal bias voltages. This
assumption is not valid for current devices. Programmable
analog supply voltages of + 12VDC; careful routing ensures
that no antifuse sees more than a 12 VDC bias. Recent M2M
antifuse FPGAs operate at lower voltages, further decreasing
the electric field strength in the biased antifuse by 35%.
Reliability studies conducted on M2M antifuses [2, 4, 5] show
MTBF as a function of bias voltage.
Antifuse rupture data is a function of heavy ion LET and
electric field strength [1] and the failure points of some of the
amorphous silicon antifuses occur at a far lower electric field
strength than either the ONO antifuses or the SiO2 reference
data [6], Failure analysis, using several different techniques,
has been conducted, assisting in the determination of failure
and investigation of the mechanisms. Emission microscope
techniques have proven successful for ONO antifuse and a
liquid crystal methodology for a variety of M2M damaged
antifuses. In addition, current-voltage curves for damaged
antifuses vary by construction.
To expand on our results, a next generation DUT card
has been built with new devices designed and fabricated for
M2M antifuses. Devices that have been tested include the
QL3025, prototype A54SX16, RT54SX16, and the
RH54SX16's, and the UT22VP10. The QL3025 is a 3.3 V,
0.35 _tm device fabricated at TSMC. Each of the SX
prototypes uses a different antifuse "recipe" for these
experiments. The A54SX16 is also a 3.3 V, 0.35 _m device
while the RT54SX16 and the RH54SX16 are both 3.3 V,
0.6 p.m devices. These devices all have 5 volt-tolerant I/O,
supported by a 5 V bias, and have a 3.3 V core. The
UT22VP10 is a 5 V PAL; the test data for this device was
inconclusive and will not be discussed in this paper. The
QL3025 had significant latchup problems, preventing an
analysis of their antifuse structure.
Results for the three SX M2M antifuse prototypes is
shown in Figure 1 where the bottom reference line is set at
3.6 volts, the maximum rated voltage for this technology. At
a LET of 37MeV-cm2/mg, all of the devices showed
significant positive margins, with no damage detected, giving
SEU-tolerant performance. At the higher LETs, differences
are observed between the three variants, with two of the
devices failing at an LET of 45 MeV-cm2/mg.
The significant result is the performance of "recipe M."
Several lots were tested, showing radiation-hard performance,
no damage at an LET of 82 MeV-cm2/mg. Additional
margin for this design was demonstrated by increasing the
bias voltage to 4.0 VDC, 11% greater than the rated
maximum. Further experiments are planned which will test
the effects of different variants of the recipes to give further
insight into the mechanism.
Testing techniques are similar for the ONO and M2M
antifuses although damage to the M2M-based structures are
far easier to detect. These structures, designed for lower
programmed impedances, also have lower impedances when
damaged by a heavy ion. Despite the higher bias across the
ONO structure, the current draw by a damaged M2M
structure is many times higher.
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III. LOGIC UPSET C. Rtt1020 Logic Upset Analysis and Mitigation
A. Introduction
Logic upset is s a transient pulse from a single ion strike.
This can occur in combinational circuits or global resources
such as clock and reset lines. Previously, logic upset was
observed in an FPGA but cross-sections were not determined.
B. Logic Upset Examples and Instrumentation
Gate upsets in the RH1280 were observed when running
at a reduced supply voltage of 3.3 VDC + 10%; there were no
logic upsets when running at supply voltages > 4.5 VDC.
Failures occurred in the voter circuits of TMR strings and
correlation with on-chip error monitors confirmed logic
upset. This is an example of a data upset, with the glitch or
runt pulse arriving at the input to the flip-flop during the
critical time when the data is latched, typically a small
fraction of a nanosecond. There was no effort to harden the
logic circuits of the RH1280, originally a commercial design.
The CX2041 (0.6 _tm), was evaluated for SEE at a bias of
3.3 VDC. In this device, a low-skew clock tree is built and
balanced to support user flip-flops. During heavy ion
irradiation, large numbers of errors appeared in bursts with
some errors disrupting the entire chip, indicating disruption
to the clock distribution network. Errors were observed
simultaneously in several independent shift register strings,
with the only common element being the clock tree.
Additionally, few errors were reported on the SEU monitor of
our SEU-hardened shift register [1], while the shift register
itself gave burst errors. This is an example of a clock upset.
The DUT stimulus pattern is critical for detecting clock
upsets: all 'l's or all 'O's are useful for detecting pattern
sensitivity in flip-flops but will mask clock upsets since an
extra clock will be undetected. Similarly, a Johnson twisted
nng counter, with at most one '1'-'0' transitions, will have
trouble distinguishing clock upsets from SEUs.
SEU time-tagging has been added to our test equipment,
permitting both SEUs and logic or clock upsets to be
measured simultaneously. Sample output from an RH1020
run is shown in Figure 2, where error counts for each of the
three monitors is plotted against sample number, with
approximately 250p.s between sampling points. The
unhardened shift register's error counts (DOS) rise linearly
and then jump approximately 17 counts, one-half the length
of the shift register. Concurrent with this jump, the hardened
output's error count (DOH) undergoes a similar jump and
stays flat, as it rejects SEU's. Note that the hardened shift
registers SEU monitor (TMR MON) never jumps, and rises
linearly with time, showing a relatively constant error rate in
the flip-flop elements. By taking the first derivative of the
error count with respect to sample number, the number of
clock upsets may be counted and the number of upsets
attributed to clock upset may be removed from the total error
count, permitting an accurate assessment of flip-flop SEU
sensitivity as shown in Figure 3.
The clock upset cross-section in pre-production models of
the RH1020 is significantly higher than that of it's
commercial cousin, the AI020B (1.0 _tm device). This is
thought to be attributed to moving the design to the higher
performance radiation-hardened process, where small runt
pulses propagate easier and flip-flops respond to signals with
a smaller pulse width and amplitude [7].
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Figure 2. Clock upset in the RH1020 with each SELf time-
tagged. The concurrent jumps on DOS and DOH, two
independent circuits, indicate clocks upset, as the clock is the
common element
20
18-
16-
14-
> '12
tll
6
4
o []
0
Illlaillllliilll...... Hlliilaam!!illlllillHiiilialllfl,.... , .... ' ........... gl Illltlllilillllli Ililllli!
50 75 100 125 150 175
• 200
Error Event Number
Figure 3. Quantitative analysis of clock upset raw data It is
performed by plotting the sample-to-sample differences in the
errors counters
Although a channeled architecture with individual
buffers and clock lines for each row, the A1020B/RH1020
shorts the outputs of the buffers together to minimize clock
skew, resulting in many common points to the distribution
network. The earlier A1020 (2.0 _m) and A1020A (1.2 rtm)
devices had isolated row buffers and similar error signatures
indicated that the upsets were present in the input stage, not
in one of the clock row drivers. A number of analytical and
experimental techniques such as laser stimulation and using a
focused ion beam (FIB) to perform circuit modifications
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furtherisolatedthe sensitive region to a TTL-compatible
input stage employing a small amount of hysteresis.
Analysis of transistor sizes and clock upset cross-sections
led to the preliminary conclusion that the upset was
happening on the clock's transition. Several experiments
were run to verify this. During heavy ion irradiation, the
input was held at either rail, with few clock upsets detected
with the clock input grounded. This dependence is consistent
with transistor-level circuit analysis, which showed a strong
asymmetry, typical of TTL-level inputs, and laboratory noise
testing on the input stage. This conclusion was confirmed
with heavy ion irradiation by measuring the frequency
dependence of the upset as shown in Figure 4, with four
devices tested from 10 kHz to 1 MHz, each run having a
fluence of 10 7 ions/cm 2. The large part-to-part variation in
Figure 4 is typical for this effect, as the propagation of a clock
runt pulse and acceptance by a flip-flop is marginal and
dependent on specific device parameters. Analysis of the
number of upsets per hit, usually about one-half of the shift
register length, confirms this as a runt pulse, consistent with
other laboratory tests and circuit analyses.
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Figure 4. RH1020 (pre-production devices) input buffer
transients resulting in "clock upsets." The upset occurs on the
transition and is shown here as a frequency dependence
While this phenomenon has been referred to as "clock
upset," we refer to it in the more general sense as "logic
upset." An examination of the schematics for non-dedicated
I/O stages showed a similar circuit construction to the
dedicated clock input pin on the 1020 series. A special DUT
was designed and constructed to verify this I/O module's
sensitivity. Since regular I/O pins in the RH1020 do not
permit access to a low-skew signal distribution network, flip-
flops were hand-placed so that the clock input for each of the
flip-flops was attached to the same routing segment and no
skew was confirmed with the static timing analyzer. While
detailed cross-sections were not measured as a result of
limited test time, upset on these I/O pins was detected,
confirming the analysis' conclusion that the fault was in the
input stage and not in the clock distribution network. These
"non-clock" pins will show an edge SEU sensitivity since
typical circuit applications such as ripple event counters use
these pins as clocks.
Based on circuit analysis and SPICE simulations, along
with the heavy ion. laser, and laboratory tests on AI020,
A1020A, A1020B, and RH1020 (including those with
modified circuits using the FIB), a new production lot was
fabricated, with the original commercial TTL-compatible
input circuit design modified to mitigate the logic upset.
While the cross-section of the original devices was low,
approximately 10 .6 cm2/Clock, the modifications resulted in a
reduction by an order of magnitude. Figure 5 shows the
results, plotting both typical pre-production data vs. an
average of five production devices. Clock upset was also
detected in the A1020, A1020A, A1020B, and CX2041
microcircuits.
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Figure 5. Clock upset performance of pre-production and
production RH1020 devices. The production devices had a
modified input circuit for improved SEE performance
IV. CONFIGURATION UPSET
A. Introduction
For many types of microcircuits, the mode and the
control of the chip may be configured in a variety of ways.
The configuration of a field programmable gate array may be
controlled by an antifuse, an SRAM cell, a non-volatile
memory cell, or a combination of these technologies.
Advanced microcircuits may contain various test modes as
well as functions reserved for the manufacturer, such as
device identification or programming.
Configuration bits may be susceptible to SEUs and a loss
of control of the integrated circuit may result. Reference [8]
gives a good overview of this type of effect and shows failure
modes for an AT28C010 EEPROM, which fall into two
classes of failures. One class corresponds to an SEU in the
output data register. A second class, consisting of two
distinct sub-classes, led to a semi-permanent loss of control
and an increase of supply current.
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B. Analysis of a Configuration Upset
Tests were run on prototype FPGAs. The devices
would, when irradiated with heavy ions, apparently lose all
functionality until the power was cycled, accompanied by
changes in the device current. The following section will
determine the failure mechanism as well as discuss test and
analysis techniques. These prototype devices implement a
new architecture for this manufacturer with test samples
utilizing two different scaling factories and three different
foundries.
A representative run showing one class of error
signatures is shown in Figure 6. A 5 V bias is used for 5 volt-
tolerant I/O and a 3.3 V bias powers the array core and output
drivers. Large currents were observed and remained until the
device's power was cycled. In some cases, the current draw
exceeded 800 mA, the programmed setting for the power
supply. Although this current rise is often a result of SEL, no
determination was immediately made. Similar results were
seen on devices from several foundries and the device
irradiated in Figure 6 was from a radiation-hardened line
using a 2 _tm epitaxial layer. The design rules for the device
were consistent with good latchup performance and the small
failure cross-section suggested a different mechanism. Other
failure signatures were observed, again with an apparent loss
of functionality. One class shows the current levels dropping
from their active state to quiescent levels.
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Figure 6. Strip chart during irradiation of a prototype FPGA
produced on a radiation-hardened, 2 grn epi line. The current
on some runs exceeded 800mA and was caused by a
configuration error from an SEU in the 1149.1 TAP controller.
25
SERIALINPUT SERIALOUTPUT
System
Logic
Inout On-
--t
It has been determined that these two cases have a
common cause, and is a result of the IEEE JTAG 1149.1 TAP
[9] specification and implementation. This standard specifies
the interface and operation of features to support test and
other operations at the board and device level.
An overview of the ' 1149.1' scan configuration is shown
in Figure 7, with a set of cells between the device's pins and
the internal core logic. This permits various operations such
as sampling the devices inputs, driving the external pins to
known values, or presenting test inputs to the device core.
The scan cells form a data register and are configured as a
shift register. Other 1149.1 functions include device
identification and other device specific features such as built-
in self test (BIST), programming, etc.
System
2-State
Output
Figure 7. The IEEE JTAG 1149.1 scan architecture. The logic
core is surrounded by the scan cells, which can perform normal
I/O functions or be controlled from the test access port (TAP).
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Figure 8. An SEU in the TAP controller. Undefined data is
loaded into the output of the Instruction Register causing an
apparent loss of functionality.
The test access port (TAP) controller commands the test
interface and registers with a sixteen-state sequencer. Figure
8 shows a simplified diagram of the basic configuration as it
is typically implemented, without the hard reset pin (TRST!,
which is optional in the standard), along with the instruction
register. The output of the instruction register controls the
device and consists of two sections, a shift register for serial
loading and a parallel latch to hold the instruction, which is
loaded and cleared on command from the TAP controller.
The JTAG nomenclature defines TCK as the clock to the
TAP controller, TDI is test data in, and TDO is test data out.
TMS (mode pin, not shown) guides transitions in the TAP
controller.
State assignments for the TAP controller may be
arbitrarily selected with the states and transitions rigidly
defined in the specification. The Test-Logic-Reset state is
used for normal operations with the TAP controller asserting
RESET, forcing the output latch to load an instruction which
does not affect the device's operation. An analysis of the
TAP controller's state diagram shows a well-designed, robust
controller for commercial and industrial applications, tolerant
of faults that would be expected in these environments (such
as pins being shorted) and no lock-up states. All paths will
return the machine to the Test-Logic-Reset state within 5
TCK cycles with TMS held high. However, when analyzing
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thestatediagramforSEUsensitivity,the machine will return
to the Test-Logic-Reset state, but, if the appropriate state bit
is upset, via a path that moves through Update-IR, which
latches new data into the instruction register's latch, giving
the microcircuit a new command mode or configuration.
Analysis of the state assignment used in the prototype devices
tested showed that a single bit error could force sequencing
through the Update-IR state.
Note in Figure 8 that the shift register located in the
instruction register is not held in reset when the TAP
controller is in the Test-Logic-Reset state. This is consistent
with the 1149.1 specification, which states that the shift
register is undefined in that state, amongst others, with the
authors of the specifications not anticipating SEUs. When an
SEU flips a bit in the TAP controller and the Update-IR is
traversed, arbitrary values are loaded into the IR register,
with an nnpredictable effect on the chips operation and state.
The small number of susceptible bits in the TAP
controller is consistent with the failure rate during heavy ion
irradiation. However, latchup was not immediately ruled out,
as we kept open the possibility that a design rule may have
been violated in one spot which was not caught by the design
rule checker. The next experiment used a 6 kHz clock
driving the TCK pin with TMS held high. 6 kHz was
selected to facilitate instrumentation while having a minimal
probability of two upsets in the 5 TCK sequence. In this
mode the device experienced functional failures during
irradiation but power cycling was not required to restore the
device to an operational mode, as would be required after a
SEL. Note that each device must be analyzed to ensure that
damage can not result from operation in this mode and that a
higher frequency for TCK should be used if devices with this
design are flown.
The failure mechanism was further investigated by
placing the instrumentation in time-tagging mode with the
6 kHz signal driving TCK. Sample results are shown in
Figure 9, with the outputs of error counters shown for the two
independent flip-flop strings, sampled at approximately
4 kHz. Three jumps are seen, with both error counters
changing simultaneously and in equal amounts, similar to
that seen from a clock upset, discussed above in Section III.
A closer examination and further tests with various DUT
stimulus proved that this similar signature could not have
been clock upset. Examination of the error counts showed
sizes that were too large to suggest clock upset for the length
of the shift registers and clock frequencies used. However, a
brief oscillation of the clock buffer could not be ruled out,
with perhaps multiple transitions. The next test was to
decrease the TCK frequency by an order of magnitude and
observe the frequency of configuration losses and the
magnitude of the jumps. By examining the error counts,
which are based by the 1 MHz DUT clock, the period of time
of the malfunction can be determined precisely. This,
coupled with decreasing the TCK frequency by an order of
magnitude, resulted in the rate of configuration upsets
remaining constant but the size of the jumps increased. The
longer periods of loss of functionality would not have
occurred in clock upset, which is an asynchronous affect.
Lastly, additional runs and changes in the input patterns
resulted in data sets where only one of the two shift registers
experienced the jumps in error counts. In this mode, by
holding the data constant, for example, a matching value in
the boundary scan register would show no errors while a fault
was occurring.
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Figure 9. Transient functional failures of a prototype FPGA
incorporating 1149.1 circuitry. The duration of the failure is a
ftmction of the TCK frequency.
V. RADIATION TEST RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
This section will summarize, discuss, and analyze recent
radiation test results of a more general character than the
sections above. Tests continue on existing programmable
products to support on-going flight programs and emerging
trends. On the advanced technology front, the first deep sub-
micron programmable data is presented which show
radiation-tolerant performance for some parameters. With
slight modifications made to the commercial foundry's
process, radiation-hard performance levels were obtained.
A. Heavy Ion and Proton Induced SEU
1) Heavy 1on Effects and Analysis
The RH1020, which is based on the A1020B commercial
design, has recently been characterized for SEU performance.
The SEU performance of the A1020B is heavily influenced by
the Act 1 architecture, which contains no hard-wired flip-
flops; latches are made by feeding back the output of the 4:1
multiplexor element back to its input via the routing channels
and through, antifuses. Radiation-tolerant performance is
obtained since the pre-laid routing tracks have a parasitic
capacitance and the antifuses have parasitic resistance which
act as a filter. The weakness of this architecture with respect
to SEU is the design of the module resulting in very
asymmetrical behavior, an artifact of its commercial origins,
with the weaker state dominating the upset rate. The
RH1020, fabricated on the Lockheed-Martin Federal Systems
(LMFS) 5 p,m epitaxial process would be expected to have
similar SEU performance to its commercial equivalent. The
data shown in Figure 10 shows this. Similarly, the Act 2
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AI280A and RH1280show similar heavyion SEU
performance.
A similaranalysiscanbeappliedtotwoquick-turnASIC
families,theQYH500(0.8p,m)andtheCX2001(0.6btm),
produced by Chip Express. Neither series contains hard-
wired or dedicated flip-flops with the NAND-based QYH500
giving superior SEU performance to the coarser grained,
multiplexor-based CX2001. Sensitive circuit nodes internal
to the CX2001 logic module may be hit by an SEU, without
the parasitic capacitance of a routing track adding to the
storage elements SEU response time as in the QYH500,
which has excellent SEU characteristics. It is interesting to
compare the CX2001 and Act 1 architectures, which are very
similar, and it can be expected that the mechanism leading to
the vulnerability of the Act 1 module leads to the SEU
performance of the CX2001 module.
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Figure 10. Comparison of SEU performance for devices
fabricated at commercial (MEC) and radiation-hardened
(LMFS) foundries.
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Figure 1 l. SEU Response of hard-wired flip-flops at 1.0 Ima,
0.6 lain, and 0.35 I,tm feature sizes. The 1.0 btrn device has a
nominal 5 V bias; the others have a 3.3 V nominal bias.
Utilizing prototype RT54SX16 and A54SX16 devices, we
can further measure and analyze the SEU performance of
3.3V technology components down to 0.35 _tm feature sizes.
Last year's study [1] of 0.6 p,m devices utilized a small
pattern oriented towards reliability testing; this study uses
pre-production devices with 400 flip-flops per DUT, giving
more accurate thresholds and cross-sections with the results
summarized in Figure 11. Both of the 3.3 V sea-of-modules
devices, with the more symmetrical circuit designs,
outperform the 5 V 1.0 I,tm A1280A. Interestingly, the
0.35 _m A54SX16 prototype outperforms the 0.6 _tm
RT54SX16 prototype with both devices having identical test
patterns programmed.
2) Proton Effects and Analysis
A number of programmable devices have been tested for
proton sensitivity and Table 1 gives estimates of cross-
sections for approximately 195 MeV protons. The AI280A
has been tested previously. A review of the data and test
plan, along with the low heavy ion upset threshold for the
hard-wired flip-flops, led us to repeat this test using an array
of 19 devices from four different production lot date codes.
Each of these devices upset, with runs being conducted at
both the worst-case 4.5 VDC and nominal 5.0 VDC supplies.
The A1280A results are discussed in detail in [10].
Table 1. Proton Sensitivities at 195 MeV
Device Type
A1280A
RHI020
RH1280
QYH500
RT54SX16
QL3025
A54SX16
JT22VP10
Size/Voltage
(nominal core)
1.o_5.ov
1.0 _,m/5.0V
o.8 m_/5.ov
0.S btm/3.3V
0.6 p,m/3.3 V
0.35Fm/3,3V
0.351xm/3.3V
N/A/5.0V
Est. X-Sec
(_m'/f-0
137 x 104_
< 2 x 104_
400 x 104_
< 0.5 x 1045
6 x 10 "]_
< 4 x 1045
-3 x 104_
2 x 10 "ll
Comments
19 devices
S-Module
No upsets
No upsets
Cypress die
The behavior of the radiation-hardened FPGAs is
examined for proton upset. The RH1280, based on the
commercial A1280XL, has a relatively large upset cross-
section, as the device was not modified for SEU hardness.
The RH1020, based on the commercial A1020B, is also
susceptible. The 3.3 VDC small feature-sized
commercial devices did relatively well, with upset cross-
sections having the same order of magnitude as the 5.0 V
RH1020 which utilizes routed flip-flops. No upsets were
detected in the QL3025's, consistent with the heavy ion tests,
where no upsets were detected with ions having a LET of
18.8 MeV-cm2/mg, although total fluence was low because of
SEL problems. The cross-sections of the prototype
RT54SX16 and the A54SX16 are low, consistent with the
heavy ion data of Figure 11.
Lastly, as seen in Table 1, no upsets were detected for
QYH530 ASICs, with devices selected from two one-mask
production lots. The devices in this test configuration were
operated at 3.3 volts.
3) SI_-IM Configuration Memory Analysis
SRAM-based FPGAs are configured by loading state
information into SRAM cells are popular commercially and,
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as discussed below, are the subject of several development
efforts for space flight electronics. These SRAM-based
devices currently hold a density edge for commercial devices,
even taking various gate counting methodologies into
account. However, for a radiation-hard device utilizing
existing architectures, there will, for the near-term at least, be
restrictions on device density.
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Figure 12. Number of configuration bits vs. gate count for four
families of FPGAs. Architectures show different "efficiencies"
per configuration bit.
The commercial SRAM-based FPGA vendors each take a
differing approach to their architecture, offering structures
such as look up table (LUT)-based and logic-based modules,
different module granularity, etc. An analysis of almost all
available and announced devices shows that the ratio of user
flip-flops to user on-chip SRAM to configuration memory is a
constant, with approximately an order of magnitude between
each storage type. Focusing on the configuration memory bits
that dominate, we can see the linear increase in configuration
storage as a function of device capacity in Figure 12. The
slopes of these curves gives a measure of the configuration bit
efficiency for each architecture that is critical for assessing
the impact of producing a radiation-hardened device. Even at
the 100kgate density level, we can see a range of
configuration bits from below 500 x 103 to almost 2 x 106.
Extrapolating to higher device densities, it is clear that
radiation-hardened devices are not practical for state of the
art commercial technologies. SEU-tolerant applications, as
discussed in [1], would employ checking circuits to verify the
contents of configuration memory and take corrective action
in the case of a fault. It would have to be shown that no
permanent circuit damage would occur. The system design
would have to be tolerant of a pause in circuit operation if a
reload or partial reload is necessary and prevent any
erroneous signals from propagating to a critical part of the
system. As device geometries continue to shrink, reducing
the 'cost' of the silicon, it may become feasible to provide a
TMR plus voter for each configuration bit with a non-
intrusive, on-chip background process scrubbing the
configuration memories.
4) Mitigation Technology
TMR for user FPGA circuits has been discussed and
analyzed in [1] and while not resource efficient, it is used for
the effective SEU-hardening of flip-flops. As the commercial
industry has moved toward hardware description languages
(HDLs) such as VHDL. designers were locked into tedious
schematic-based solutions. Over the past year, modifications
and scripts for commercial software have been released,
offering a choice of HDL tools as well as macro generators
and custom schematic libraries. Typically, the designer may
select levels of SEU hardening, such as limiting flip-flop
selection to "C-Modules" or by selecting TMR structures.
B. Single Event Latchup
Recent latchup test results are shown in Table 2.
Destructive effects were observed for the two Quicklogic
devices, the QL24x32 and the QL3025. The 0.65 Ism series
Cypress device had been tested previously with similar
results. The QL3025 is a member of the new pASIC3 family,
utilizing a 0.35 gm TSMC process.
Quick-turn ASIC prototypes are configured by 'laser
programming' while flight devices are processed with a one-
mask technology. The one-mask QYH530's performed
similar to the LPGA devices which were tested in [1], with
SEL LET thresholds of approximately 60 MeV-cmZ/mg. The
thin-epi CX2041 LPGA devices easily latched, both at
VCC = 5.0 and 3.3 volts. Recent testing did not detect
latchup at a LET of 37 MeV-cmZ/mg when biased at 2.5 volts.
Lastly, while commercial XC3090's had a SEL threshold
of approximately 4-7 MeV-cmZ/mg [1], the specially
processed XQR4036XL prototype showed no latchup at an
LET of 100 MeV-cm2/mg at a temperature of 125°C, showing
radiation-hard performance for this parameter [11].
Table 2. Latchup Summary
Device Type
RH 1020
QL24x32B
RT54SX16
QYH530
CX2041
A54SX16
QL3025
XQR4036XL
Size/Voltage
(nominal core)
Loe.m/_.ov
0.65pm/5.0V
0.6 Fm/3.3V
0.8 _m/5.0v
0.6 paW2.5V
0.35/am/3.3V
0.35Fm/3.3V
0.35/asn/3.3V
Threshold
(MeV-cmZ/ms)
> 74
Comments
< 18 Destructive
> 82
52 One-Mask
> 37 LPGA
> 74
< 11 Destructive
> 100
C. Total Dose
Lot-specific total dose testing is used to support on-going
NASA flight programs. The 1.0 t,tm A1280A/MEC and the
0.8 _tm A14100A/MEC are popular devices with space flight
designers utilizing commercial/military-grade technologies.
We have seen performance for the A1280A and the A14100A
(Act 3) of about 7-10 krads (Si) and greater than 20 krads (Si)
respectively. Recent test data show the start of a trend, with
severely decreased TID performance for recently fabricated
AI280A, AI460A, and A14100A die.
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Recent data is shown in Figure 13 for new 0.35/am
3.3 VDC, 0.45 _tm 5.0 VDC, and 0.6 p.m 3.3 VDC devices.
The 5 V A42MX09 did poorly at about 6 krads (Si) while the
3.3 V core devices all showed solid radiation-tolerant
performance. Of note is the specially processed 0.35 _tm
XQR4036XL, which passed the 60 krad (Si) point with no
parametric or functional failures. Devices have been
submitted for product analysis as it is thought the reduction in
specific structure dimensions has played a role in the
increased total dose performance of these four 3.3 V device
types, clearly indicating a trend. 0.35/am, 3.3 VDC CX3001
prototype performance results will soon be added to our
database.
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Figure 13. TID performance for new and prototype DUTs.
COTS produced devices with a 3.3 volt core exhibited
radiation-tolerant performance; a modified COTS device
passed at > 100 krads (Si).
Process modifications have been made to the prototype
RT54SX16, with three splits of our test lot. Split 'A' was
fabricated unmodified from the typical process, and lot splits
'B' and 'D' represent different levels of modification. A
series of experiments validated the predictions, with improved
total ionizing dose performance. With very conservative test
standards and no annealing, lot split 'B' passed at 80 krads
(Si) and lot split 'D' easily passed at the 100 krads (Si) level.
This experiment shows the potential for a modified COTS
part exhibiting radiation-hard, total dose performance.
Further testing has been conducted on the 0.8 Ixm
QYH500/Yamaha series. Previous testing [1] used laser
programmed parts useful for rapid prototyping. Recent
testing on two lots of "one-mask" devices, which are
programmed with a single etch and are passivated, had
performance levels of 15 to 30 krads (Si). The same DUT
logic design was put into the more architecturally attractive
0.6p.m CX2041/Tower device, showing a total dose
capability of approximately 7 krads (Si). Based on the results
of the prototype deep sub-micron FPGAs, we will next
evaluate the 0.35 l.tm CX3001/CSM family.
VI. HARDENING EFFORTS
A. RHI 020 and RHI 280 Devices
Over the last few years, RH series devices have been
produced, using Lockheed-Martin Federal Systems as a
foundry. Initially the commercial design was to be used,
which kept the COTS design intact, achieving total dose
hardness from the use of the LMFS process. While the
A1020B 10 _m epi device does latchup [12], qualification
testing on the RH1020 5 p.m epi process showed no sign of
latchup and excellent total dose performance.
Based on the susceptibility of the ONO antifuse to
rupture as a result of heavy ions [12], the antifuse thickness in
the RH series was changed, decreasing the electric field
strength which provides a more radiation-tolerant solution.
Section III discussed the vulnerability of the RH1020's input
buffer to single event transients and the improvements gained
by redesigning the circuits. No effort was made to harden the
storage elements with SEU performance ranging from low
tolerance to "rad-tolerant" levels.
B. CGaAs CLAy-IO
The goal of the AFRL/NASA/Motorola/SPEC
complementary GaAs FPGA is to provide for low power, high
speed, electronics for communication applications. Using
0.7 _tm low temperature technology, it is planned to achieve
350 MHz performance using a 1.5 VDC power supply with
no SEL, an SEU LET > 20 MeV-cmZ/mg, and a total dose
hardness exceeding 100 Mrads. The device is architecturally
based on the re-programmable National Semiconductor
CLAY-10 architecture.
C. SOIAT6010
This NASA/SNLPrloneywell/Atmel program will
radiation-harden the AT6010 using a Honeywell silicon-on-
insulator process. Goals for the program include a total dose
hardness exceeding 200 krads (Si), no SEL, and an SEU
threshold of > 30 MeV-cm2/mg for both user storage and the
configuration elements. This FPGA will be a 5 V device.
D. XQR4OOOXL
By special processing, the XQR4036XL, a 0.35 _tm
device, as discussed in Section V, has demonstrated a total
dose capability of 60 krads (Si) while meeting functional and
parametric specifications. No latchup of the 7 _tm epi-based
device was detected at an LET of 100 MeV-cm2/mg and a
temperature of 125°C [13].
E. R TSX and RHSX
These 0.6 rtm devices are based on the commercial
A54SX series and have had prototypes tested over the past
two years. RTSX prototypes are produced at MEC and RHSX
prototypes are "fabricated at LMFS. As discussed in Section
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V, total dose hardness for the RTSX can be made greater than
100krads (Si) and the RHSX prototype easily passes
200 krads (Si) [1]. A radiation-hardened antifuse structure
has been demonstrated passing tests at a LET of
82.3 MeV-cm2/mg. Present design modifications include the
addition of the optional TRST! line to harden the IEEE JTAG
1149.1 TAP controller and a modified hard-wired flip-flop to
increase SEU hardness from radiation-tolerant levels to
radiation-hard. This device operates with a 3.3 VDC core
and is 5 V-input tolerant.
VII. CONCLUSION
Programmable devices will continue to be of increasing
importance to spacecraft electronics designers as system
requirements increase the trend towards higher performance
electronics with increased processing bandwidth and shorter
development times. These devices will be required for on-
board processing of the increasing data volumes from sensors
that cannot be accommodated by typical data storage and
compression schemes with the available down link telemetry
rates. State-of-the-art, commercial programmable devices
have recently progressed rapidly down the technology curve,
with operating frequencies rivaling that of high-powered
discrete designs and ASICs, in many cases.
Programmable devices can be either custom-designed for
space applications or rely on commercial technology and its
associated infrastructure. While most programmable devices
for space flight are derivatives of commercial designs, the
LMFS PROM was designed with radiation issues in mind
utilizing a low (0.1 V) bias across unprogrammed ONO
antifuses to ensure high-reliability.
Commercially-derived devices' radiation tolerance range
from poor to radiation-tolerant, in most cases. Some of the
radiation hazards stem from structures and technologies that
are perfectly reliable in the conunercial/military sector, such
as antifuses, TTL-compatible input buffers, flip-flop designs,
and circuits such as the JTAG TAP controller, as examples.
Total dose performance of 5.0 VDC devices is highly
variable, subject to process variations at the commercial
foundries.
We have shown that devices' radiation performance
levels can be increased to radiation-hard levels without the
use of an expensive radiation-hard process. This is through a
combination of modification of circuit designs and
commercial processes. Examples include a radiation-
hardened antifuse and total dose performance greater than
100 krads (Si). A number of manufacturers are now actively
modifying their designs and their foundries' processes to
increase the radiation performance of commercially produced
devices
Within the next few years, the commercially produced,
modified devices will likely provide solid radiation
performance for the majority of applications, including high-
speed processing. Similarly designed devices, produced on
traditional radiation-hardened lines, will be available for high
levels of radiation performance.
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IX. APPENDIX I. SUMMARY OF DEVICES AND TECHNOLOGIES
Device Series Foundry
CSM
CSM
MEC
MEC
MEC
Contlg. Core
Teclm. Volt.
SRAM 2.5
ONO 5
ONO 5
ONO 5
ONO 5
VF-I
A40MX02 t 40MX
A42MX09 t 42MX
A10201 ACt 1
AI020A l Act 1
AI020B _ Act 1 ONO
A1280A _ Act 2 MEC ONO
AI4100A _ Act 3 ONOMEC
MEC ONO
CSM M2M
Atmel EEPROM
Atmel SRAMAT6K
5
5
5
5
3.3
5
5
A1460A i Act 3
A54SX16 t SX
AT28C0102 AT28C
AT60102
Size
0tm)
0.18
0.45
0.45
2.0
1.2
1.0
1.0
0.8
0.8
0.35
0.8
Device Series
CX2041 a CX2001
CX3061J CX3001
JT22VPI04 PAL
QL24x32 _
QL3025 _
QYH5303
RHI020 t
RH12801
RH54SX16 _
RT54SX16 _
pASIC 1
pASIC3
QYH500
Act 1
Act 2
SX
SX
UT22VP106 RadPAL
XQR4036XL 7 XC4000XL
Foundry
Tower
CSM
Cypress
Cypress
TSMC
Yamaha
LMFS
MEC
LMFS
MEC
UTMC
Conflg.
Techn.
METAL
METAL
FUSE
M2M
M2M
METAL
ONO
ONO
M2M
M2M
M2M
SRAM
Core SIZe
Volt. (/_m)
3.3, 5 0.6
3.3 0.35
5
5 0.65
3.3 0.35
3.3, 5 0.8
5 1.0
5 0.8
3.3 0.6
3.3 0.6
5
3.3 o _t_
Foundry Information
CSM: Chartered Semiconductor Manufacturers
MEC: Matsushita Electric Company
TSMC: Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Corp.
LMFS: Lockheed Martin Federal Systems
UTMC: United Technologies Microelectronics Center
Device Manufacturers
Actel
2 Atmel
3 Chip Express
4 Cypress
5 Quicklogic
6 UTMC
7 Xilinx

